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Abstract—In this paper, we develop a game theoretic for-
mulation for empowering cloud enabled HetNets with adaptive
Self Organizing Network (SON) capabilities. SON capabilities
for intelligent and efficient radio resource management is a
fundamental design pillar for the emerging 5G cellular networks.
The C-RAN system model investigated in this paper consists
of ultra-dense remote radio heads (RRH) overlaid by central
baseband units that can be collocated with much less densely
deployed overlaying macro base stations (BS). It has been
recently demonstrated that under a user centric scheduling
mechanism, C-RAN inherently manifests the trade-off between
Energy Efficiency (EE) and Spectral Efficiency (SE) in terms of
RRH density. The key objective of the game theoretic framework
developed in this paper is to dynamically optimize the trade-off
between the EE and the SE of the C-RAN. More specifically,
for an ultra-dense C-RAN based HetNet, the density of active
RRHs should be carefully dimensioned to maximize the SE.
However, the density of RRHs which maximizes the SE may
not necessarily be optimal in terms of the EE. In order to
strike a balance between these two performance determinants,
we develop a game theoretic formulation by employing a Nash
bargaining framework. The two metrics of interest, SE and EE,
are modeled as virtual players in a bargaining problem and the
Nash bargaining solution for RRH density is determined. In the
light of the optimization outcome we evaluate corresponding key
performance indicators through numerical results. These results
offer insights for a C-RAN designer on how to optimally design
a SON mechanism to achieve a desired trade-off level between
the SE and the EE in a dynamic fashion.
Index Terms—C-RAN, SON, Outage Capacity, Energy Effi-
ciency, RRH density, Game theory, Nash Bargaining Solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
By the year 2020, the growth in mobile data is expected to
increase by more than 1000 folds as compared to 2010 [1].
Consequently, the emerging 5G wireless networks should be
able to support this massive proliferation of mobile devices
and triggered exabyte flood. Therefore, 5G technology is
expected to: 1) be able to support 1000 times of traffic
density more than today’s networks; 2) be capable of serving
10 to 1000 times more terminals than today’s networks; 3)
achieve better network coverage. In order to make the capacity
demands required for the upcoming 5G technology possible,
networks densification will be an essential part of 5G [2]. It
is envisioned that such densification will be realized through
the ultra-dense deployment of small cells. Cloud-based Radio
Access Networks (C-RANs) are expected to facilitate the
densification of cellular networks through the deployment
of distributed Remote Radio Heads (RRHs) [3], [4]. The
main characteristic of C-RAN architecture is that the base-
band processing unit (BBU) is separate from the distributed
RRHs. Each RRH is connected with the cloud BBU pool
via a front-haul which is often a fiber optic cable. Such a
centralized RAN architecture enables the implementation of
complex coexistence and scheduling mechanisms. The net
overhead of implementing such mechanisms is less than what
would occur in traditional autonomous small cell networks.
Another benefit that C-RAN architecture provides is that it
enables significant energy savings. It is established that RRHs
do not require energy expenditure compared to traditional
macro-BSs where cooling and running of computing systems
results in significant energy consumption. This distributed
architecture carried by a central management unit enables the
implementation of advanced interference mitigation schemes,
such as interference alignment [5]. All of these features which
can be exploited from implementing C-RAN have triggered
intensive research in this area including [5]–[8]. Another new
cellular networks design philosophy in context of 5G is to
transform the clustering scheme from a base station centric
approach to be user-centric [9], [10]. Benefits of following
such an approach are dynamic coverage and higher link suc-
cess probability. Dynamic coverage is provisioned by turning
on only the RRHs which are needed to serve the desired user
at a certain quality of service (QoS). A higher link success
probability is achieved due to higher gain in the received signal
strength (RSS) at the mobile user (MU). This diversity enabled
gain is attained from having several active RRHs in the user-
centric cluster. This clustering scheme has been explored by
[10], [11]. There are several key performance indicators (KPI)
that can be used to quantify C-RAN performance. The most
important of these KPIs is the spectral efficiency (SE). A study
on the SE in terms of outage capacity (OC) was conducted by
[10], which shows how the OC relates to the density and to the
employed transmission power of RRHs in each tier. Another
important KPI that needs to be taken into consideration during
C-RAN’s design and deployment is the energy efficiency of
the network. Power consumption in C-RAN has been a subject
of intensive research. Such research attempted to characterize
and reduce the power needed to perform tasks such as joint
downlink and uplink user-AP association and beamforming
[12], decoding data [13], and resource allocation [14]. A study
on energy efficiency in dense small cells networks for different
on/off schemes has been studied in [15].
II. CONTRIBUTIONS & ORGANIZATION
In this work, we study the inherent trade-off between the
SE and the energy efficiency (EE) in C-RAN where user-
centric clustering is performed. In particular, we examine how
the two KPIs, the SE and the EE, vary with the density of
active RRHs in a C-RAN network. Firstly, we summarize
a user-centric clustering scheme and present an analytical
framework that characterizes the SE in form of an OC formula.
Thus, we will use the terms SE and OC interchangeably
throughout this paper. The next step, is to characterize the cost
of implementing a user-centric clustering mechanism. This is
achieved by deducing a formula that quantifies the EE on the
holistic level of the network. Our formula quantifies the energy
that is needed for selecting the best RRH which will serve the
MU in each user-centric cluster. We demonstrate that there
exists a trade-off between the EE and the SE in terms of RRH
density. The key objective of this study is to provide a SON
capability for the selection of RRH density per tier that would
provide the best trade-off between the SE and the EE. To
achieve this goal, we utilize a game theocratic formulation
to find the RRH density value by modeling the problem as
a bargaining problem. We find the Nash bargaining solution
(NBS) which achieves the best balance between those two
KPIs.
As discussed in the introduction section, a number of prior
studies have explored the EE and the SE in context of macro
and small cell networks [5], [10]–[15]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, this paper presents the first study of its
kind that investigates the trade-off between the EE and the
SE in the context of C-RAN, where user centric clustering
is implemented, and utilizes a game theoretic framework to
optimize the solution. This paper builds on very recent results
presented in [5], [10]–[15].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section III,
we describe the user-centric clustering scheme and character-
ize cell OC. In section IV, we quantify the effect of RRH
density on power consumption in the network. We examine
the trade-off between the two performance metrics in section
V. In section VI, we formulate the problem as a bargaining
game and validate the required axioms for it to have a Nash
bargaining solution. Numerical results of NBS and discussion
are presented in section VII. The paper is concluded in section
VIII.
III. OUTAGE CAPACITY UNDER USER-CENTRIC
CLUSTERING MECHANISM
In this paper, we consider the downlink operation of a large
scale cellular network provisioned by a dynamic user-centric
clustering scheme. Under such mechanism, the first tier is
constituted by macro BSs and the remaining (k − 1) tiers
correspond to small cells thats consist of RRHs. It is assumed
that dissimilar RRH densities and transmission powers are
employed per tier. Various user-centric clusters can be formed
within each tier. The total bandwidth is divided into sub-bands
where each sub-band is assigned to one cluster. Sub-bands are
allocated to clusters in a manner that cross-tier interference is
eliminated. The user-centric clustering mechanism is managed
by the C-RAN control center. For an arbitrary MU, the C-RAN
central controller locates the best tier that can serve the MU
under a specific QoS requirement. The QoS requirement is
captured by having the MU as a center of a cluster that does
not contain any other scheduled users except for the targeted
MU. Each cluster is represented by a circle with radius R and
is centered around the MU. The average number of RRHs
inside each cluster is assumed to be greater than unity. The
operation of forming a user-centric cluster proceeds as follows:
The macro BS that is closest to the MU transmits a pilot
signal to it. The MU, in return, retransmits the pilot signal
to all RRHs contained within it’s cluster. The corresponding
RRHs examine the received strength of the pilot signal. The
RRH selection mechanism chooses the RRH which will be
able to provide the targeted MU with the highest RSS among
the group of RRHs located within the cluster. It is worth noting
that none of the RRHs contained within the cluster are allowed
to concurrently serve any other MUs until the targeted MU
finishes its current activity. The benefits attained form applying
this mechanism can be summarized as:
1) RRH selection diversity enables a higher gain in the
received signal at the targeted MU.
2) Since each cluster uses its own sub-band and no overlap-
ping clusters are allowed, this permits an effective mit-
igation of both co-tier and cross-tier interference. Any
users who belong to overlapping clusters are scheduled
to be served later.
3) The dynamic scheduling employed in this scheme en-
ables energy savings. Only the best RRH is activated,
while the rest of RRHs are put in sleep mode.
We characterize the relationship between RRH density and
the cell outage capacity in a k-tier C-RAN, where the propaga-
tion channel suffers from Rayleigh fading complemented with
large scale power-law path-loss, by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For a desired reliability constraint ρ, the
outage capacity is defined as the maximum downlink through-
put which can be obtained in the network such that the
outage probability for the MU remains below a per-designated
reliability threshold ρ. The upper-bound on the outage capacity
under ρ is given as
Cρ ≤ log2
⎛
⎝1 +
(πδΓ(δ)∑ki=1 λiP δi )δ
−1
σ2 ln(1/ρ)δ−1
⎞
⎠ , (1)
where the noise at the receiver is assumed to be additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) represented by a random variable
with Gaussian distribution of N (0, σ2); δ is a path loss
dependent constant given as δ = 2/α for path loss exponent
α > 2. k is the number of tiers in the C-RAN. We assume
that the RRH density in each subsequent tier is denser than
its antecedent tier. Thus, we denote λi as the RRH density for
tier i ∈ k. This can be stated in terms of the baseline density
λl, where λi = η
iλl for η ≥ 1. Pi is the transmitted power per
tier i ∈ k which can be calculated by Pi = β
iPl, where β ≤ 1
and Pl is the baseline power employed at the parent tier. It is
assumed that RRHs in each tier consumes less power than its
parent tier.
Proof: Please refer to [10] ∎
IV. POWER CONSUMPTION IN C-RAN
It is important to quantify the cost of implementing the
user-centric clustering scheme in terms of power expenditure.
This allows us to compare the attained diversity gain with
the consumed power in the network. One penalty for having
diversity gain is that all RRHs in the cluster have to be active
during the RRHs selection phase. The more active RRHs are
available to choose from, the higher is the achieved diversity
gain, but the more total power is consumed per cluster. This
process creates a trade-off between the EE and the SE of
the user-centric clustering mechanism. The EE of the network
can be quantified as the cost function of implementing the
clustering mechanism. In order for our evaluation to be valid,
we only focus on the energy consumed during RRH selection
phase, as it represents the overhead caused by the user-centric
clustering scheme.
A. Power consumption model
Power consumption of various types of wireless networks
has been investigated in [16]. The authors in [17] focus on
power consumption for multi-input multi-output discontinuous
transmission in C-RAN. We extend the formula described in
[17] in order to quantify power consumed in the network
during the discovery process of the RRH, which can be
quantified as:
PCRAN = ξCRAN +∆µPµ + P0µ, (2)
where Pµ is the transmit power employed by the MU. ∆µ is a
parameter that relates power consumption with the employed
radio frequency. P0µ is the fixed power consumed by the
hardware of the MU. ξCRAN is the C-RAN coefficient, which
represents the total consumed power by every active RRH in
all k-tiers of the network. It shows the proportional relation
between power consumption on the wide network level and the
density of RRHs and their employed transmission power per
tier. The C-RAN coefficient is also proportionally related to θ,
which represents the efficiency of the implementation. Hence,
the C-RAN coefficient ξCRAN is expressed by the following
equation:
ξCRAN = θ
k
∑
i=1
λiPi, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, (3)
where θ = 0 represents the most energy efficient implementa-
tion.
B. Energy Efficiency
The energy efficiency measures the number of bits trans-
mitted per unit of bandwidth at the expense of one Joule
during one second. We quantify EE according to the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. We can express the energy efficiency at the
network level by the following analytical expression:
ωEE =
BCρ
θ∑ki=1 λiPi +∆µPµ + P0µ
, (4)
where the transmission bandwidth B is normalized to unity.
Proof: Proof of this proposition directly stems from the
definition of EE at the network holistic level, thats is: The
ratio of sustainable throughput for each scheduled user to the
power consumed at the user mobile device and the RRHs
during the RRH selection phase. In other words EE is the
ratio of [bits/s/Hz] over consumed units of [Joule]. ∎
V. TRADE-OFF BETWEEN OUTAGE CAPACITY AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY
To examine the effect of RRH density in each tier, we start
by examining the effect of baseline RRH density λl on the
OC and EE. We analyze OC as expressed in (1) and the
EE as expressed in (4) for various values of baseline RRH
density λl. We perform the analysis using the parameters
from Table I with different variations of η and β. Figure 1a
depicts the impact of RRH density per tier on OC. It can be
concluded from the corresponding graphs that OC increases as
RRHs become denser. Figure 1a consolidates the observation
that after certain RRH density, the corresponding OC plot
becomes saturated and no significant gain can be obtained
from increasing RRH density any further. The optimal RRH
density for maximum OC and the corresponding peak OC
values are shown in the second and third columns of Table
II. Figure 1b shows the changes in EE with an increase in
RRH baseline density. It can be observed from figure 1b that
EE increases with RRH density up to a certain RRH density
threshold. Intuitively, for a large increment rate η in RRH
density, EE drops significantly. Columns 2 and 3 from Table
III show the optimal RRH density values which result in peak
EE values. By examining the second column from Tables II
and III for each case study, we notice a major difference in the
optimal RRH density values. This simple comparison clearly
demonstrates that there exists an inherent trade-off between
the two performance determinants, EE and OC in C-RAN
under user centric clustering. A self-organizing capability is
essential here to guarantee that the best throughput and energy
efficiency are achieved and maintained in the C-RAN. This
self-organizing feature should be able to dynamically select
the most appropriate number of RRHs that should be active in
each tier to achieve the desired level of balance between OC
and EE, while taking into account spatio-temporally changing
channel and user distributions. In the next section we will
employ a game theoretic framework to solve this dilemma.
VI. GAME THEORY FRAMEWORK
In the previous section, we concluded that selecting the best
baseline RRH density would require a trade-off between the
OC and the EE. Therefore, a SON mechanism for Cloud BBU
pool must be devised such that the baseline RRH density
strikes a desired balance between those two performance
determinants. As we will see, a game theoretic approach can
provide a solution to this dilemma. We propose modeling the
two performance metrics as virtual game players. Cell OC is
modeled as the first player with (1) as its utility function, and
the EE is modeled as the second player with (4) as its utility
function.
A. Game Formulation
Each player’s payoff is affected by the selection of baseline
RRH density λl made by the other player. Benefiting from
the centralized management in C-RAN, we can define the
problem as a cooperative game. The two players will have
to negotiate for the value of λl. Both players mutually benefit
from reaching an agreement over the optimal baseline RRH
density. Thus, both cell OC and EE can reach an optimal trade-
off. We prove that this negotiation process can be modeled as
two-player Nash Equilibrium bargaining game.
B. The Bargaining problem
Let N = {1,2} be the set of the players, where player i = 1
denotes OC and player i = 2 denotes EE, and Si denotes the
set of all feasible payoffs to a user i, as:
Si = {Ui∣Ui = Ui(λl), λl ∈ R ∶ λl > 0}. (5)
Let’s define the space S as the set of all feasible payoffs that
player i ∈ N can achieve when they work together is:
S = {U = (u1, u2)∣u1 ∈ S1, u2 ∈ S2}, (6)
where u1 is the utility of the first player and u2 is the utility
of the second player where
s1 = u1 = Cρ(λl), (7)
s2 = u2 = ωEE(λl), (8)
and λl ∈ R ∶ λl > 0. We also define the disagreement space
(D ∈ S) as the set of the two disagreement points d = (d1, d2),
where d1 = u1(D) and d2 = u2(D) represent the payoff for
each player if the bargaining process failed and no outcome is
reached. For our game we set d = (0,0). Therefore, we give
both players the same bargaining power in the game.
Proposition 3. The problem described by (18) and (19) is
a two-player bargaining problem defined by the pair (S,D)
where S ⊂R2 and D ∈ S.
Proof: For a bargaining problem to be defined, S should be
a convex and a compact set [18]. Since it is clear that S is
compact, we only need to prove that it is a convex set:
∀ǫ ∶ 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 and if Ua = (ua1 , ua2) ∈ S and U b = (ub1, ub2) ∈ S,
then ǫUa + (1 − ǫ)U b ∈ S.
Since u1 = log2(1 + (πδΓ(δ)∑
k
i=1
λiP
δ
i
)δ
−1
σ2 ln(1/ρ)δ−1
), we denote the SIR
as γ and re-write it as: u1 = log2(1+γ) where γ ≤ ρ. Without
loss of generality we can apply the condition of convexity on
1+γ. Since taking the logarithmic values of a convex set will
not change its convexity property:
ǫua1 + (1 − ǫ)ub1 = 1 + γ¯, (9)
where 1+γ¯ = 1+
(πδΓ(δ)∑
k
i=1
(ǫλa
i
+(1−ǫ)λb
i
)P δ
i
)δ
−1
σ2 ln(1/ρ)δ−1
), where 0 < λai
and 0 < λbi , thus it can be easily concluded that values of 1+ γ¯
form a convex set and that the same applies to the values of
log2(1 + γ¯). Hence, we prove that:
ǫua1 + (1 − ǫ)ub1 ∈ S1. (10)
As for the utility of the second player, we use the same
aforementioned definition for γ and γ¯ from above. Similarly
we find:
u2 =
B log2(1 + γ)
θ∑ki=1 λiPi +∆µPµ + P0µ
. (11)
we already proved that the outcome of the numerator is convex
set, as for denominator:
θ
k
∑
i=1
λ¯iPi +∆µPµ + P0µ, (12)
where ∑ki=1 λ¯iPi = (∑ki=1 ǫλai +∑ki=1(1 − ǫ)λbi)Pi
thus, we write
ǫua2 + (1 − ǫ)ub2 =
B log2(1 + γ¯)
θ∑ki=1 λ¯iPi +∆µPµ + P0µ
, (13)
Since 0 < λai and 0 < λ
b
i , we find that the denominator is also
convex. Thus, we conclude that:
ǫua2 + (1 − ǫ)ub2 ∈ S2, (14)
from (10) and (14) we conclude that the ǫUa + (1 − ǫ)U b ∈ S
and the set S is convex. ∎
C. Nash Bargaining Solution
In order for a bargaining problem to have a solution U∗ =
(u∗1, u∗2) for the disagreement space D = (d1, d2), Nash has
specified four axioms that the bargaining outcome must satisfy
[18]:
1) Pareto Efficiency: The Nash bargaining solution must
be Pareto-optimal. This means that there cannot be a
solution where utilities of both players can be improved
in the same time. This concept can be mathematically
expressed as:
(U1, U2) > U∗ ⇒ (U1, U2) ∉ S. (15)
2) Symmetry: The solution of the bargaining problem
should remain the same if the roles of the two players


